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The case “Carillion PLC: Fake It ‘Til You Break It” explores the recent collapse of Carillion, 
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effects of operating under high leverage; and (iii) effectiveness of Corporate Governance 
entities, namely the Board of Directors, External Advisor and Investors. 
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Carillion PLC: Fake It ‘Til You Break It 
 
“Carillion’s rise and spectacular fall was a story of recklessness, hubris and greed” 
House of Commons - Government report on Carillioni  
 
On January 15, 2018, a typical rainy Monday in the U.K., Emma Mercer, Carillion’s Finance 
Director since September 2017, sat at her office in the company’s headquarters in 
Wolverhampton, West Midlands. Looking out the window, she noticed the busyness of cafés, 
the frantic walks of those trying to get to work, and the hectic buzzing of cars. Outside, business 
unravelled as usual, yet oblivious to the bankruptcy of Carillion, marking the largest trading 
liquidation known to date in the history of the U.K.iv. 
The London Stock Exchange would make the announcement at the opening of business 
operations, and whilst she counted down the minutes until 8a.m., Emma Mercer thought back 
of the past year. She had returned to the U.K. in April 2017 after spending three years on the 
Canadian side of the business, only to find the company she had devoted her career to at the 
start of its demise. At the time, she had questioned Richard Howson, Carillion’s CEO, and Zafar 
Khan, the Finance Director, on the company’s accounting practices, which had become rather 
aggressive during her time abroad, but her concerns had been dismissedlvii. Perhaps if she had 
remained in the U.K., the situation would have been different. But it was too late to dwell on 
past decisions. The clock struck 8a.m. and her phone immediately lit. The Financial Times read: 
Carillion collapses into liquidation 
“Carillion has filled for compulsory liquidation after talks with lenders failed over the 
weekend.” 
Financial Times, January 15 2018lvi 
 
 




The Building Block 
“Carillion was no ordinary company, and no ordinary collapse” 
House of Commons – Government report on Carillioni 
Carillion PLC was created in July 1999, following a spin-off from Tarmac, the British 
construction and aggregates group. The new company focused on construction and facilities 
management, whilst Tarmac retained the heavy materials portion of the businessii. At the time 
of the spin-off, Carillion counted on 14,000 employees, annual revenues of £1.8bn, no debt, 
and a market capitalization of £200 millionii. 
Carillion’s establishment coincided with a difficult period for the U.K. construction industry. 
The early 1990s recession had led to over-capacity in the sector and motivated firms to adopt a 
“bid low, claim high”v strategy. Typically, construction projects are granted through a bidding 
process - companies start by submitting a proposal to undertake a certain job for a particular 
price (i.e. tender), and the project is then awarded to the company proposing to complete the 
job for the lowest price (i.e. lowest bid). Given the excess supply of the time, companies would 
thus subject themselves to bids below production costs in order to get the job, transferring the 
risks to subcontractors and hoping to recoup any possible profit during the duration of the 
projectvi. Under these circumstances, the UK government begun promoting a high number of 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI)1 projectsvi, engaging companies in strategic alliances, and re-
focusing their businesses to long-term growth. 
Finding it hard to grow organically, Carillion expanded through acquisitionsi. In 2006, it 
purchased Mowlemvii for a total of £350 million, with estimated cost savings of £15 million p.a. 
starting in 2007 and, in 2008, it acquired Alfred McAlpine for £572 million (savings were 
estimated at £30 million p.a. by the end of 2009viii). In 2011, it closed the acquisition of Eaga 
PLC, a heating and renewable energy provider, for around £300m (Exhibits 1A and 1B). With 
the latter, Carillion hoped to be capable to expand on to the carbon emissions marketix. 
However, and despite confidence on the deals completed, analysts did not always share the 
company’s view. In particular, the McAlpine deal was followed by a wave of diverging views. 
Whilst some analysts pointed to the high strategic fit and possibility for improving margins, 
 
1 PFI deals are contracts between the public sector and private companies to deliver a specific asset. The private 
company raises funding to build the asset and, once this one is finished, taxpayers make annual payments to the 
private company over the duration of the contract (typically 25 to 30 years). In the U.K., these have been 
particularly used to build public infrastructures (i.e. schools, hospitals, roads)lxi. 




others questioned whether Carillion was being too careless in closing negotiations after a short 
six weeks of due diligenceviii. 
Mowlem, Alfred McAlpine and Eaga were all purchased for an amount superior to the fair 
value of their tangible net assetsi. This difference is defined as “goodwill”, and it represents the 
intangible assets of the purchased companyxiv. In Carillion’s case, the company recognised 
amounts of goodwill higher than the purchasing price for all three acquisitions, as the fair value 
of the tangible net assets was, in all cases, negative. In particular, intangible assets increased 
£431m with the Mowlem deal, £634m with McAlpine2 and £329m for Eaga (please refer to 
exhibits 2A, 2B and 2C). Because it is considered to have an indefinite useful life, goodwill is 
not amortised, and companies must value it on a yearly basis, determining if an impairment 
charge is required. Despite the later success, or not, of the acquisitions made, Carillion’s 
goodwill was never impaired. In specific, Eaga presented losses of £113 million on the first 
year following the acquisition, as well as for the five consecutive yearsi. 
International expansion was also a key aspect of Carillion’s strategy, and the company sought 
growth in Canada, the Caribbean and Middle Easti. Once again, M&A activity played a crucial 
role. In 2012, Carillion purchased a 49% stake in the Bouchier Group, a Canadian provider of 
road maintenance and infrastructure services, for £24 millionx, and one year later it acquired 
John Laing’s facilities management and support services unit, John Laing Integrated Servicesxi. 
Other international projects include a £395m contract for the Msheireb Downtown Doha 
projectxii, which marked the company’s disastrous expansion into Qatar. Despite representing 
only one out of 13 contracts Carillion bid for in the countryxiv, the Msheireb contract was 
particularly challenging for Carillion. The company did not only encounter negotiation issuesi; 
xiii, but it failed to properly plan and manage the project, which was expected to be completed 
by 2014 but remained unfinished at the time of Carillion’s collapse. 
The emphasis given to growth proved successful, and by 2014, Carillion was the second largest 
construction company in the U.K. by turnover and the largest one by profit (Exhibit 3)iii. 
However, it was that same year that Carillion saw its dream of becoming the largest U.K. 
construction company wrecked, when its apparent unending series of acquisitions found in 
Balfour Beatty, the U.K.’s leading construction company and Carillion’s biggest rival, a 
stumbling block. After three offers rejected on the basis of lower expected synergies than those 
suggested, Carillion effectively gave up on negotiations. At the time, Beatty’s management 
 
2 Restated amount. At the time of the acquisition, the value recorded was £615 million. 




pointed that “cost savings driven by shrinking the business should not be confused with 
synergies”xx and, despite controversy, time would tell Balfour Beatty might as well have been 
right in doubting Carillion’s cost savings’ judgement. 
Growth was largely funded through debt (Exhibits 4A and 4B). In 2006, Mowlem PLC was 
purchased in a stock and cash combination, and total debt jumped from £90m to £253m. In 
2008, it increased again to £484m following the purchase of Alfred McAlpine, whose form of 
payment was also mixed. By 2012, and sustaining the 100% cash Eaga deal, debt amounted to 
£813m. This funding was, in its majority, provided by the state-owned Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), as well as HSBC, Santander UK, Lloyds, and Barclayslviii. 
Whilst Carillion’s management continued highlighting its focus on a balanced capital structure, 
shareholders worried over the company’s inability to decrease debt on a sustained basis. Back 
in 2013, investors had already started betting against Carillion’s sharesxvi and when, in 2015, 
UBS reiterated its “Sell” ratingxxi on Carillion, claiming the company’s debt was higher than 
publicly stated, discontent became even largerxxii.  In particular, and following several meetings 
with Carillion’s management over concerns of corporate governance, strategic direction, and 
financial management, Standard Life Investments, an active management company and one of 
Carillion’s major shareholders, begun divesting its 10.8% share in the companyxvii. 
Amounting to the increasing debt were high pension funds’ deficits. Initially, Carillion was 
responsible for two main defined benefits pension schemes - one available to regular employees 
and the other restricted to executive directors and senior employeesi. In 2009 these were closed 
to additional employees, but the company retained obligations accumulated until the datei. 
However, the worrying deficit situation did not arise from Carillion’s own pension schemes, 
but rather from its acquisitions’ policy. With deals as that of Mowlem and Alfred McAlpine, 
Carillion acquired their respective pension deficits. By 2016, the company had collected 
involvement in 14 different pension schemes, and faced a deficit of £804.8 millionlxxvi,pp.128. 
Finally, Carillion’s working capital management was sustained on mistreatment of its suppliers. 
Despite signing the Government’s voluntary Prompt Payment Codexxiii, which states companies 
should pay at least 95% of their invoices within 60 days, the firm was famous for its late 
payments, making suppliers wait as long as 120 days. The firm was also accustomed to 
objecting invoices on technical grounds, thus extending payment schedules even further. 




Moreover, its Early Payment Facility (EPF3), operated by Santander UK, forced suppliers to 
take discounted payments in case they wished to be paid on time, at the same time as it helped 
conceal issues in working capital managementi.  
Caving In 
 “The mystery is not that it collapsed, but that it lasted so long” 
House of Commons – Government report on Carillioni 
Carillion’s collapse was sudden and unexpected. The immaculate image of a profitable business 
hid large debt, high pension funds’ deficits and a questionable suppliers’ conduct. The 2016 
Statement of Accounts details revenues of £4.4 billion and an operating profit of 
£145.6mlxxvi,pp.90 (Exhibits 5A and 5C). Operating margins rounded the 5% and were described 
as “attractive relative to peers”xxv and total assets surpassed the £4 billion (Exhibit 5B). There 
were over 40,000 employees. However, on the 10th of July 2017, the company issued a profit 
warning, announcing a total write-off of £845m, including £375m for UK contracts and £470m 
related to projects in the Middle East and Canadaxxvi. It further stated first half profits would be 
lower than expected, and that debt had increased. CEO Richard Howson stepped down, being 
immediately replaced by interim CEO Keith Cochranexxvi. The share price fell 39%xxvii (Exhibit 
6). Remaining dividends for the year were cancelled and the company would now initiate a 
restructuring of its business, increasing selectivity for new contracts and aiming to leave non-
core marketsxxvii. 
Carillion dug its own grave.  From July onwards, the history of the UK giant becomes an 
avalanche of poor events. By the 12th of July, share value had fallen 70%i. On the 14th, EY was 
nominated to support Carillion’s strategic shift and HSBC was appointed as a new financial 
advisor, substituting Morgan Stanley, and increasing speculation on a possible rights’ 
issuei;xxviii. But it was too late to counterbalance debt by rising equity. 
Nonetheless, up until the last week of August forecasts seemed rather bright, and the board was 
assured the group was unlikely to require further lendingxxix. Yet, in classic Carillion style, it 
was not long until the situation changed proportions. On the 3rd of September, the board was 
called for an extraordinary meeting where Zafar Khan, Carillion’s Finance Director, admitted 
 
3 An EPF, also known as reverse factoring or supply-chain financing, is a financing solution under which a bank, 
working as an intermediary, agrees to pay a certain company’s invoices at an accelerated rate, in exchange for a 
discount. 




new funding was necessaryxxix. Short after, on the 11th of September, he was dismissed and 
immediately substituted by Emma Mercerxxx. 
The second profit warning came by the end of September, when Carillion announced a £200m 
additional write-off and £140m extra debtxxxi, committed by the company’s five major lenders 
– RBS, HSBC, Santander, Lloyds and Barclays. Full year performance was now estimated to 
be lower than market expectations and total revenue was set at £4.6bn, lower than the previously 
stated £4.8bn-£5bn. On the same day, shares plunged an extra 20%xxxi. 
The third and final profit warning was released on the 17th of November. With it, Carillion 
strived for an extension on the testing of its financial covenants, stating it expected breaches by 
the end of the year and it would need additional capital. Carillion’s financing arrangements 
included covenants determining leverage, in the form of net debt over EBITDA, must not 
surpass the 3.5x, whilst interest coverage must be more than 3.5x. The announcement further 
added the company anticipated profits to be materially lower than expectedxxxii. The share price 
fell 34%xxxiii. 
In a never-ending series of misfortunes, the first week of December was marked by material 
changes to cash-flow forecasts, significantly reducing short-term revenues’ expectationsi. By 
the second week, Kiltearn partners, an asset management company and one of Carillion’s major 
shareholders, had halved its stake in the firmxxxiv. Long negotiations with possible lenders failed 
at giving the company the capital it needed to continue operating and, on the 31st of December, 
Carillion filled for Government supporti. Short after, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
announced the beginning of an investigation into the company’s announcements between 
December 2016 and July 2017xxxv, pointing to the possibility of misstatements. 
By the 13th of January 2018, and after meeting with the Government to discuss the need for 
funding, Carillion made a final request for £160m, admitting the alternative scenario was 
insolvencyxxxvi. However, the new year did not arrive with new opportunities, and after a long 
weekend of negotiations, the Cabinet Office and Carillion’s creditors concluded they would not 
be willing to provide additional support to Carillioni. With only £29 million in cash, the 
company admitted its insolvency. On the morning of the 15th of January, Carillion filled for 
compulsory liquidation and released a statement to the London Stock Exchange, immediately 
ceasing the trading of its sharesxxxvii. 
 “This is a very sad day for Carillion, for our colleagues, suppliers and customers that 
we have been proud to serve over many years. (…) In recent days however we have been unable 




to secure the funding to support our business plan and it is therefore with the deepest regret 
that we have arrived at this decision.  (…)” 
Philip Green, Chairman of Carillion from 2014 to 2018 xxxvii 
At the time of insolvency, the business counted on 43,000 employees worldwide, 30,000 small 
suppliers, and 450 contracts with the UK Governmentxxxviii. RBS, HSBC, Barclays, Santander 
UK, and Lloyds were owed over £900 million in bank loans, as well as £750 million from a 
fully drawn revolving credit facilitylviii.  
The Bedrock’s Failure 
“Carillion’s board are both responsible and culpable for the company’s failure” 
House of Commons – Government report on Carillioni 
Board of Directors 
Often compared to the heart of a company, the board of directors has a crucial role in ensuring 
the healthy functioning of a company. Indeed, its responsibilities amount to monitoring 
executives and the company performance, as well as to advise management on the strategic 
direction of the businesslxxvii.   
Perhaps in a premise of what was to come, Carillion had a bumpy start. During the shareholder 
meeting assembled to consider Tarmac’s spin-off, discussions intensified over alleged 
breaching of conventional corporate governance practicesxxxix. In particular, the desire to give 
a dual-role to Sir Neville Sims, that would take the positions of both Chairman and Executive 
Director of the yet to be created Carillion, and the potential for unlimited executive bonus 
packages in the new company did not please shareholders. Notwithstanding, and despite the 
47% investor abstention, the spin-off followed throughxl. By 2001, Simms was replaced by John 
McDonough as the Group’s CEO and the board of directors had a total of 11 members, of which 
5 were non-executive. 
John McDonough was at the helm during the acquisitions of Mowlem, Alfred McAlpine and 
Eaga, as well as during the company’s development in international markets. At the time, Chris 
Girling was the Finance Director and Philip Rogerson held the Chairman position, after 
replacing Neville Simms in 2005. Chris Girling retired in 2007, leaving Richard Adam as the 
new Finance Director. Following McDonough’s retirement in 2011, Richard Howson, 
previously Carillion’s Operations’ Executive, took over as CEO. Philip Green, who had joined 
the board as a non-executive director back in 2011, was nominated Chairman in 2014, thus 
substituting Philip Rogerson. 




Prior to the July 2017 profit warning, Carillion’s board perfectly illustrated the ideals of 
Corporate Governance theory (Exhibits 7A, 7B and 7C). It counted on seven members – Philip 
Green, Chairman; Richard Howson, CEO; Zafar Khan, who succeeded Richard Adam as 
Finance Director in the beginning of 2017; and independent directors Keith Cochrane, Andrew 
Dougal, Alison Horner and Ceri Powell. In full compliance with the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2014), it appropriately balanced different expertise, tenure, and experience. At the same 
time, it counted on an extensive management structure, composed of five leading committees 
– Nominations Committee, Business Integrity Committee, Sustainability Committee, Audit 
Committee and Remuneration Committee (Exhibits 8A, 8B and 8C)  – and four minor teams, 
led by the Group’s CEO and focused on aspects as major projects, leadership, health and safety, 
and pension schemes. Each unit operated under defined policies and procedures, was led by 
board members and supervised by the Chairman. In 2016, the board met ten times and 
attendance was exemplary.  
Non-Executive Directors (NEDs)  
In accordance with the UK Corporate Governance Code, NEDs have the responsibility of 
scrutinising and monitoring management’s performance, constructively challenging their 
executive counterparts and ensuring the daily operations of the company aim to meet its long-
term objectivesi. But, when it came to Carillion, asking questions was the simple path to 
individual peace of mind. Challenging the management team was carried as a “ticking the box 
of good Corporate Governance” approach and it failed to confront executives on fundamental 
issues until it was too late to back out. 
To start with, the company’s growing debt seemed of little importance to the board until it 
reached unsustainable proportions. Whilst described by Keith Cochrane, Senior Independent 
NED and later interim CEO, as of “lesser concerns” in 2015xlii, it is rather astonishing how it 
jumped, shortly after, from £632m to £961m. Not even shareholders’ concerns spiked the 
board’s attention. After raising worries over the rising risk profile of Carillion, Standard Life 
Investment recalls the company’s response, including that of the Chairman Philip Green, as of 
a clear disposition to maintain the current strategy, which was not only accumulating debt to 
make acquisitions but also failing to convert profitability into cash-flowxxv.  
Problems were not, however, restricted to debt. Cash collection was an ongoing debate during 
meetings and the board admitted the difficulty of operating certain markets and generating cash-
flows in major contractsxxv. Even after Carillion’s collapse, the picture portrayed was always of 




an aware board, that asked questions and challenged key issues. In the eyes of the board, had 
not it been for deterioration in a few contracts and Carillion would continue thrivingxxv. 
However, and once again proving the board’s issue acknowledgement was limited, the 2017 
Audit Committee papers detail that problems were anything but confined to three or four 
contracts, with at least 18 contracts presenting losses for the period of March to June 2017i. 
In addition, it is rather naïve to assume the board was oblivious to management’s optimistic 
forecasts and aggressive accounting, which sustained the company’s flawless market image. 
Board minutes from June 2017 highlight concerns over the dangers of inadvertently 
“maintaining the traded margin”, at the same time as they show Andrew Dougal’s worries over 
severe problems with one major contracti. That same contract proved to be the Royal Liverpool 
Hospital, for which, back in November 2016, management had decided to override an internal 
peer review assessment that detailed it was making lossesi. 
Whilst financial stability was treated as a minor concern, dividend payment did not get easily 
discarded. Carillion had a progressive dividend policy whose goal was to balance dividend 
payments with business performance. By 2016, the company had consistently increased 
dividends since its formation, but reality was that the pace at which dividends grew bore little 
relation to profits nor did it account for available cash from operations (Exhibit 9). In fact, the 
last dividend, totalling £55 million, was paid in June 2017, shortly before the first profit 
warning. It was the Board’s responsibility to approve dividends and ensure these do not limit 
the company’s future commitments, investment needs, or ability to sustain long-term growth. 
But in January 2017 upon the possibility of withholding dividends, figures from this same 
board, as Keith Cochrane and Andrew Dougal, opposed, preferring to pay higher dividends 
than available cash, as opposed to sending a negative message to the marketi. 
Combined with dividend policy, executive remuneration was considered crucial. More often 
than not, discussions around it would monopolise board meetings. The company’s remuneration 
policy was to pay the industry medianxlii and when in 2015 an analysis conducted by Deloitte 
showed Carillion paid below it, the Remuneration Committee decided to increase the basic 
salary of CEO Richard Howson, Chairman Philip Green, and other senior executivesi. However, 
this “paying mid-table” approach presents two issues – first, it is not linked to performance. 
Indeed, whilst share price was declining - 20% in 2015 and 22% in 2016 -, Richard Howson 
saw his basic salary increasing £50,000 both in 2015 and 2016, and Philip Green benefitted 
from a salary increase of 11% in 2016lxxvi (Exhibits 10A and 10B). In addition, and despite 




failing to meet his financial targets, Howson was awarded a £245,000 bonus in 2016lxxvi,pp. 68-
69. Secondly, by raising salaries to meet the median level, companies increase the median itself, 
which combined with full detachment from financial performance simply meant Carillion had 
the room to design executive packaging as it pleasedi. 
Excessive remuneration did not, however, go unnoticed to shareholders. In the AGM of 2017 
20% of shareholders voted against the remuneration report, even after Carillion had discarded 
its plans to raise the maximum executive bonuses to 150% of salary following shareholders’ 
protestsi. The board was, however, indifferent to such discontent. Not only were there no efforts 
to review remuneration policies, but minutes from a meeting held the day before the first profit 
warning detail the Remuneration Committee had agreed to increase management’s pay by as 
much as 30%, at the same time as it had decided on a £750,000 salary to be paid to the interim 
CEO Keith Cochrane, a value much higher than that paid to Richard Howsoni. 
Executive Directors (EDs) 
Richard Adam was appointed Finance director in 2007, position he held until leaving the 
company in December 2016 xlii. Responsible for the company’s finances for over a decade, he 
was behind the aggressive accounting Carillion pursued. 
Accounting for construction services is rather complicated. Starting with revenues, as these 
must be recognized as construction work progresses, and independently from cash collection, 
companies must find in themselves a way to assess how far on their projects are. Generally, 
companies follow the percentage of completion method. Thus, if a certain job is considered to 
be 50% completed, the company will recognize that same proportion of revenues and costs. In 
Carillion’s case, completion was estimated by applying the percentage of costs already incurred 
in proportion to total estimated costslxxvi,pp.86. Revenue was then recognized as that same 
percentage in proportion to the initially agreed contract price, fact that laid great pressure on 
stated margins. Despite the fact stated margins were both reviewed in internal meetings and 
compared with peersi, a Deloitte examination carried after the first profit warning found peers 
recommended a lower margin for many cases, and that for over half of those the difference 
exceeded the £5 millioni. Furthermore, Carillion recognized large sums of “traded not certified” 
revenue that had not yet been signed off by clients and was, therefore, of uncertain 
materialization. In December 2016, the value recognized was of £294 million, 10% of the total 
contract revenue recognizedi.  




Carillion’s accounting for its early payment facility (EPF) was also dubious, and both Moody’s 
and S&P pointed it concealed the company’s true level of debti. Although the appropriateness, 
or not, of such accounting was never commented by the Financial Reporting Council, it is clear 
it ultimately benefited Carillion. First, drawing on the EPF was reported as “other creditors”, 
and it was excluded from total debt and covenant tests. Moody’s claims the misclassification 
totaled much as £498 millionlxiii that should have been treated as debt (Exhibit 11). Further, the 
EPF helped the company meet its 100% cash conversion target, by allowing drawings on the 
facility to be recognized as cash inflows from operations, rather than financingi. A Moody’s 
analysis found that reclassifying EPF inflows from operating to financing resulted in a 7% cash 
conversion rate for the period 2013-2016, far from the picture Carillion was depictingi. 
Whilst these aggressive accounting practices might have been oblivious to some, they were 
certainly not to Richard Adam. In fact, it took the ex-Finance Director a short three months to 
sell his existing shares, for £534,000, after leaving the company in January 2017. In May 2017 
he sold an additional £242,000, handed as part of a bonus schemelxiii. 
Richard Howson was appointed CEO in December 2011, having been with the company since 
its beginning and a part of its board since 2009. Although not on the board during the Mowlem 
and Alpine acquisitions, Richard Howson was a board member by the time of the Eaga 
purchase, as well as the CEO accompanying majority of the company’s development in the 
Middle East. He was also top management during the company’s continuous dividend 
increases, which, for the particular cases of 2012 and 2013, were paid on debtxlii. 
Moreover, as Carillion’s CEO, Richard Howson oversaw the Chief Executive Leadership Team 
(CELT), which was responsible for strategy development, operational and financial 
management, and executive management of the company’s businesseslxxvi. The 2016 Chief 
Executive’s strategic overview reads: 
“We will deliver sustainable, profitable growth by: - winning high-quality contracts in our 
chosen markets; - delivering contracts safely, sustainably and to best-in-class standards; - 
developing and attracting excellent people and capabilities” 
Carillion PLC, Annual Report and Accounts 2016lxxvi,pp.10 
Such fact did not, however, prevent the CEO from distancing himself from Carillion’s rising 
issues. Even after the collapse, Richard Howson openly neglects responsibility over the matter, 
depositing it on “long term and from a long time ago” contractsxlii. In the same line, and despite 
admitting a large portion of his time was spent trying to collect cash in Qatar, Howson stressed 




he had no responsibility over the Msheireb contractxlii, as he no longer held responsibility over 
the Middle East business by then. He held, nonetheless, responsibility over managing the 
company and its risks and was aware the company continued bidding in Qatar. 
Zafar Khan stepped in as Finance director in January 2017, having previously been the Group’s 
Financial Controller. Thus, and despite the short period during which he was Carillion’s 
Finance Director, he ought to know the accounting practices the company was involved in. In 
September 2017, short before the company’s collapse, Emma Mercer took over the position. 
Mercer was the first Finance director to raise concerns over Carillion’s accounting policiesi. 
A Weak External Layer 
“Carillion was not just a failure of a company; it was a failure of a system of corporate 
accountability (…).” 
House of Commons – Government report on Carillioni 
External Auditor - KPMG 
As Carillion’s external auditor, KPMG was tasked with the responsibility of obtaining 
reasonable assurance on the appropriateness of the company’s financial statements – i.e. 
assuring these are free from material misstatementsxliii. KPMG carried out this role for 19 years, 
without ever finding reason to provide a modified opinion on Carillion’s accounts. Carillion’s 
financial statements and disclosure of principal risks were continuously assessed as not only 
complying with the required principles, but also truly and fairly representing the state of the 
company. When questioned on the sudden provision Carillion made in July 2017, the position 
KPMG took was in hand with that of many directors – the business’ downfall followed 
unexpected developments, all taking place after the publication of the 2016 accountsi. 
Despite stating previous audits had been comprehensivei, it is rather surprising it took until May 
2017 for the auditing company to note Carillion’s aggressive policing, which was only 
identified during a “deep dive” management review of key contractsi. However, KPMG’s 
questionable auditing is not exclusive to revenue recognition nor to Carillion. The Financial 
Reporting Council’s 2016-2017 audit quality review of KPGM not only notes the need for the 
company to re-assess and increase testing on revenue auditing, but it concludes on a lack of 
challenge to management’s assumptions on impairment of goodwillxliv. Carillion’s acquisitions 
over the years meant it accumulated high amounts of goodwill - in 2016 the amount recorded 
on the balance sheet was of £1.6 billion. These values were never impaired on the company’s 
accounts. Although it could mean management remained confident on the materialization of 




synergies, it is rather surprising such assumption was never put into question, especially when 
deals as the Eaga one were recording a lossi. Moreover, it was later noted the value of 
acquisitions was in 80% derived from perpetuity assumptions. This aspect was never noted on 
Carillion’s financial accounts, neither by the company nor by KPMGi. Nonetheless, the task 
carried out granted KPMG yearly auditing fees of £1.4 million, as well as £200,000 or more for 
the non-auditing tasks performed (Exhibit 12). 
Advisors 
Carillion’s board was advised by a wide number of firms, some of which highly accounted in 
the industry, as the Big Four, Lazard, Slaughter & May, and Morgan Stanleyi. Among these, 
Deloitte was the appointed internal auditor, thus tasked with the role of providing independent 
assurance on the efficacy and functioning of governance, risk management and internal control 
processesxlv. Deloitte performed this role since 2010.  
Despite the obvious governance and risk management issues Carillion presented, inside 
controls were deemed effective up until the end of 2016xlvi and, in over 300 recommendations 
made between 2012 and 2016, only 15 were considered of high priorityi. The government 
inquiries conducted after the bankruptcy further note Deloitte had no knowledge of major issues 
of the business, as the contract disputes in Qatarxlvi. 
Deloitte’s involvement with Carillion extended to other areas and the company advised the 
remuneration committee, was responsible for the Due Diligence process on the Eaga acquisition 
and was later responsible for developing a transformation program for this same deali. 
As for the remaining advisors, Carillion’s directors were quick to sought second opinions when 
the one provided contradicted their owni. This is the case of Morgan Stanley that was dismissed 
from its financial advisor position in July 2017 after refusing to underwrite Carillion’s proposal 
to raise equityi. 
Investors 
Although responsibility over the long-term success of a company relies primarily with the 
Board, shareholders also play a relevant role by engaging with management and holding it 
accountable for the fulfillment of its dutiesli. Indeed, investors are assumed to have a self-
interest on the return of the capital they invest and are thus expected to seek information that 
allows them to determine which companies present the best prospects. Once capital is invested, 




it is presumable shareholders have a self-interest in monitoring the company’s performance at 
multiple levels, including corporate governance, to ensure capital is correctly usedlii.  
By the beginning of 2017, Carillion’s largest shareholder was BlackRock, with approximately 
9% of issued share capital, followed by other investment management companies, as Schroders 
(7.8%), Franklin Resources (6.5%), Brewin Dolphin Holdings (5.8%), Kiltearn Partners (5%) 
and Letko, Brosseau & Associates (5%) (Exhibit 13A). Investment advisors held nearly 90% 
of Carillion’s shares. 
Despite apparent similarities, their independent strategies meant each company differed in the 
way by which engaged with Carillion’s board and management. Both Schroders and Franklin 
Resources found in divesting the solution to their concerns over Carillion’s situation and by the 
second quarter of 2017 both companies held an insignificant position in Carillion (Exhibit 13B). 
In BlackRock’s case, the position it held was through passive funds, thus meaning it divested 
its position as Carillion’s share price fell and the company was removed from certain 
indexesxxv,Q1008. In fact, Amra Balic, managing director of BlackRock, noted BlackRock never 
held an active position in the company and pointed to “real questions” over Carillion’s debt, 
contracts, and acquisitions, as well as to its overly optimistic managementxxv, Q1008. It still, 
however, discussed with management, namely over executive remuneration for the year 2017. 
As long-term investors, Brewin Dolphin focused its engagement with Carillion on matters of 
maintenance of financial flexibility, in opposition to maximization of short-term profitslv. It 
held routine meetings with management, the last one taking place in March 2017, where 
possibilities of financial improvement and reviews of operational aspects were covered. 
However, short after the July profit warning it changed its assessment on Carillion and begun 
divesting. By the end of 2017 it held only 1% of the issued share capitallv. As for Kiltearn 
Partners, its long-term investment decisions were largely based on the audited financials. 
Therefore, the company often engaged with Carillion – on the 2017 Annual General Meeting it 
voted all its shares against excessive executive remuneration, and it met with Keith Cochrane 
short after the July profit warning to discuss funding needs. Despite efforts, Kiltearn Partners 
concluded Carillion’s recovery was unlikely and that financial statements were no longer 
reliable. After one last meeting in October 2017, the company fully divested its positionliii.  
Finally, Letko, Brossau & Associates (“LBA”) invests in companies it believes to have long-
term potential and was a shareholder of Carillion since April 2012. During June 2017, LBA 
asked for a meeting with management, but despite the multiple requests this one never followed 




through. On the day of the July profit warning, it held an urgent call with Carillion’s senior 
management, after which it decided to retain its position in the company, believing there was a 
fair likelihood of the company remaining in operations. LBA further admitted being prepared, 
at the time, to inject more capital in Carillion. Another call and email exchanges occurred 
following the September profit warning. However, in November 2017 and right after the third 
profit warning, LBA determined Carillion’s survival was unlikely and divested its positionliv.  
The Ruins 
“Carillion’s private failure is a public problem” 
Financial Times, January 15, 2018 lxiv 
At the time of its collapse, Carillion counted on 19,000 U.K. employees and 43,000 worldwidei. 
Many more worked along its extensive supply-chain. By May 2018, over 2,000 people had 
already been dismissedi. It owed the 27,000 members of its defined benefit pension schemes a 
total of £2.6 billion, of which only a small portion will be paid by the Pension Protection Fund, 
and it was a major supplier of the U.K. Governmenti. Carillion counted on 450 construction and 
service projects for the public sector, which ranged from road building to providing school 
meals. By May 2018, the maintenance of essential services already amounted to tax 
contributions of £150 millioni. 
Carillion’s liquidation had effects much beyond the company’s boundaries. The £2 billion it 
owed to its over 30,000 small suppliers left the lucky ones struggling and pressured to lay off 
staffxlvii, whilst it ultimately led others to their own demise. The first causality took place only 
two months after Carillion’s bankruptcy, when the engineering company Vaughan Engineering 
filed for administration in March 2018. The subcontractor was owed £650,000 for already 
completed projects for Carillion and it had been contracted for £1.1 million further work within 
the first three months of 2018xlviii. But Vaughan Engineering were not the only ones shaken up 
by Carillion’s downfall. Over 700 U.K. building companies filed for insolvency in the first 
quarter of 2018, a 20% rise compared to the same period on the previous yearxlvix.  
Finally, and as the company’s largest lenders, U.K. high street banks were highly exposed to 
Carillion’s collapse. By the end of the first quarter of 2018, total hit was estimated to surpass 
the £1 billion, with Santander alone declaring bad loans of £203 million related to Carillionlix. 
The bank further admitted Carillion’s downfall had contributed to a 21% profit fall within the 
same periodlx. The impact on Lloyds was also visible, with the bank declaring impairment 
charges of £270 million and a 5% fall in profitlix.   
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19/03/2004 Peterhouse Group PLC Babcock International Group PLC 261,21 6,09 0,29
10/12/2007 Inspace PLC Willmott Dixon Ltd 336,56 16,73 1,03
09/09/2008 Taylor Woodrow Ltd Vinci PLC 130,25 6,01 0,12
14/07/2014 Agility Projects AS Woodford Group PLC 163,14 29,58 0,91
Announcement Date Target Acquirer Transaction Value (in $m) TV/ EBITDA TV/Sales
$m
Stock Market Data
EV at Announcement Date 594,552 1110,668 409,60 327,773 261,226 367,799
Share Price at Announcement Date 3,609 10,93 1,93 4,738 4,069 2,261
Financial Data
Net Sales (LTM) 3976,872 2199,787 1 107,60 239,789 870,424 342,839
EBITDA (LTM) 28,491 62,28 78,15 32,437 41,584 21,038
Net Income (LTM) -23,101 33,686 42,65 15,321 -18,66 12,852















Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon 
 







Source: Thomson Reuters Eikon 
  
 
4 TV to EBITDA and TV to Sales were extracted from Thomson Reuters Eikon and are calculated as Rank Value 
to LTM Ebitda and LTM Sales. Rank Value is the deal value excluding liabilities assumed divided by the 
percentage of the company acquired or sought in the deal plus Value of Liabilities assumed 




Exhibit 2A: Carillion’s Goodwill Evolution, 2005-2016 
 
Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2005-2016lxv-lxxvi 
 
Exhibit 2B: Acquisitions of Goodwill Information, 2005-2016  
Year Description 
2005 
Acquisition of Planned Maintenance Group Ltd (PMG). Increase in Goodwill of £34.5 
million. 
2006 Acquisition of Mowlem plc. Increase in Goodwill of £430.8 million. 
2008 Acquisition of Alfred McAlpine. Goodwill recognition of £633.5 million5. 
2011 
Acquisition of Eaga (renamed to Carillion Energy Services). Goodwill increase totalling 
£329.1 million. 
2012 Acquisition of the Bouchier Group. Increase in Goodwill of £20.8 million 
2013 
Acquisition of John Laing Integrated Services (JLIS). Goodwill recognition of £4.3 
million. 
2014 
Acquisition of 60% equity of Rokstad Power Corporation (Rokstad). Goodwill 
recognition of £70.1 million. 
2015 Acquisition of the Outland Group (Outland). Increase in Goodwill of £43.4 million. 
 




5 Restated amount. At the time of the acquisition, Goodwill recorded was of £615 million. 
54
484 466
1 101 1 101 1 102
1 431 1 452 1 450












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Carillion's PLC Goodwill Evolution (in £m), 2005-2016 
Goodwill at January 1st Acquisitions* Goodwill at December 31st




Exhibit 2C: Details on the recognition of Goodwill for the Mowlem plc, Alfred McAlpine 
and Eaga acquisitions 
 
Mowlem plc Goodwill recognition, as of 2006 
Source: Carillion PLC Annual Report and Accounts, 2006lxvi 
 
Alfred McAlpine Goodwill recognition, as of 2008 








Eaga Goodwill recognition, as of 2011 













Legend: ▲ Up from 2013 
  ▼ Down from 2013 
   ■ No change from 2013 
 
Source: “Top 100 Construction Companies 2014”, The Construction Indexiii 
  




Exhibit 4A: Carillion’s Debt Evolution, 2005-2017 (Interim) 
 
Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2006-2017 (Interim)lxv-lxxvi 
 
Exhibit 4B: Carillion’s leverage evolution in comparison with peers in the UK Construction 
Sector, 2013-2016 
 












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
(Interim)
Carillion PLC Total Debt (in £m), 2005-2017
Balfour Beatty 0,989 -32,308 0,778 -0,886 1,046 -1,217 1,088 6,000
Kier Group 0,671 -0,900 1,040 2,468 0,744 1,899 0,572 5,100
Interserve 0,317 0,381 0,795 2,392 0,827 2,405 1,309 -11,642
Morgan Sindall 0,111 -2,772 0,134 -1,883 0,246 4,467 0,076 -4,424
Laing O'Rourke 0,459 -4,249 0,312 -4,292 0,324 -19,598 0,850 -0,921
Galliford Try 0,144 0,186 0,272 0,047 0,320 0,135 1,014 0,065
Keller 0,529 1,402 0,542 1,200 0,737 1,567 0,908 2,058
Carill ion PLC 0,639 1,271 0,726 0,809 0,621 0,740 0,944 1,195
December 2013 December 2014
D/E Net Debt / EBITDA
December 2015
D/E Net Debt / EBITDA D/E Net Debt / EBITDA D/E Net Debt / EBITDA
December 2016




2013 2014 2015 2016 30/06/2017
Total Revenue 4 080,9            4 071,9            4 586,9            5 214,2            2 246,9            
Less: share of joint ventures' revenue (748,3)              (578,0)              (636,2)              (819,3)              (394,3)              
Group revenue 3 332,6            3 493,9            3 950,7            4 394,9            1 852,6            
Cost of Sales (2 984,6)           (3 166,4)           (3 609,8)           (4 044,2)           (2 566,0)           
Gross profit/ (loss) 348,0               327,5               340,9               350,7               (713,4)              
Administrative Expenses (268,2)              (166,4)              (195,2)              (217,8)              (250,3)              
Profit/ (loss) on disposal of Public Private Partnership equity investments 44,6                 13,9                 37,7                 12,7                 0,8                   
Group Operating Profit 124,4               175,0               183,4               145,6               (962,9)              
Analysed between:
Underlying Group operating profit/ (loss) 187,8               191,8               208,4               199,6               70,1                 
Intangible amortisation* (19,2)                (16,8)                (20,0)                (13,8)                (7,4)                  
Non-recurring operating items (44,2)                -                   (5,0)                  (40,2)                (1 025,6)           
Share of results of joint ventures 26,5                 25,1                 26,0                 36,3                 (151,7)              
Analysed between:
Operating profit/ (loss) 41,0                 34,2                 36,0                 54,3                 18,0                 
Net financial expense (10,1)                (6,4)                  (7,1)                  (13,2)                (4,6)                  
Non-recurring operating items -                   -                   -                   -                   (163,9)              
Taxation (4,4)                  (2,7)                  (2,9)                  (4,8)                  (1,2)                  
Profit/ (loss) from Operations 150,9               200,1               209,4               181,9               (1 114,6)           
Analysed between:
Underlying profit/ (loss) from operations 214,3               216,9               234,4               235,9               82,3                 
Intangible amortisation* (19,2)                (16,8)                (20,0)                (13,8)                (7,4)                  
Non-recurring operating items (44,2)                -                   (5,0)                  (40,2)                (1 189,5)           
Non-operating items (0,7)                  (9,9)                  (2,5)                  (1,1)                  (8,4)                  
Net financial (expense)/ income (39,6)                (47,6)                (51,8)                (34,1)                (30,0)                
Analysed between:
Financial income 7,7                   2,3                   2,4                   2,5                   2,2                   
Financial expense (47,3)                (46,3)                (60,3)                (60,4)                (34,2)                
Fair value movements in derivative financial instruments -                   (3,6)                  6,1                   8,2                   -                   
Changes in contingent consideration relating to acquisitions -                   -                   -                   15,6                 2,0                   
Profit/ (loss) before taxation 110,6               142,6               155,1               146,7               (1 153,3)           
Analysed between:
Underleying profit before taxation 174,7               172,9               176,5               178,0               50,3                 
Intangible amortisation* (19,2)                (16,8)                (20,0)                (13,8)                (7,4)                  
Non-recurring operating items (44,2)                -                   (5,0)                  (40,2)                (1 189,5)           
Non-operating items (0,7)                  (9,9)                  (2,5)                  (1,1)                  (8,7)                  
Fair value movements in derivative financial instruments -                   (3,6)                  6,1                   8,2                   -                   
Changes in contingent consideration relating to acquistions -                   -                   -                   15,6                 2,0                   
Taxation (4,3)                  (15,1)                (15,7)                (17,2)                32,1                 
Profit/ (loss) for the period 106,3               127,5               139,4               129,5               (1 121,2)           
Profit/ (loss) attributable to:
Equity holders of the parent 100,2               120,7               132,8               124,2               (1 123,6)           
Non-controlling interests 6,1                   6,8                   6,6                   5,3                   2,4                   
Profit/ (loss) for the period 106,3               127,5               139,4               129,5               (1 121,2)           
Earnings per share 23,3p                 28,0p                 30,9p                 28,9p                 (261,2)p            
Basic 23,2p                 25,4p                 28,2p                 25,9p                 (261,2)p            
Diluted
*Arising from business combinations
























Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013-2017 (Interim)lxxii-lxxvi  




2013 2014 2015 2016 30/06/2017
Non-current Assets
Property, Plant & Equipment 128,2               140,9               140,5               144,1               138,2               
Intangible assets 1 552,8            1 610,8            1 634,2            1 669,3            1 551,2            
Retirement benefit assets 3,8                   6,1                   12,7                 5,8                   10,1                 
Investments in joint ventures 152,0               130,6               160,5               174,9               99,5                 
Other investments 7,3                   9,3                   4,7                   5,4                   3,9                   
Deferred tax assets 112,6               142,6               103,8               163,8               184,3               
Total non-current Assets 1 956,7            2 040,3            2 056,4            2 163,3            1 987,2            
Current Assets
Inventories 48,6                 50,1                 64,3                 78,8                 57,3                 
Trade and other receivables 1 212,3            1 325,4            1 270,8            1 664,0            1 185,3            
Cash and cash equivalents 413,7               472,0               462,2               469,8               390,4               
Derivative financial instruments 2,2                   -                   14,6                 46,4                 40,7                 
Current asset investments 2,4                   1,9                   -                   -                   -                   
Income tax receivable 4,0                   0,7                   1,2                   10,8                 7,6                   
Assets classified as held for sale -                   -                   -                   -                   0,9                   
Total current assets 1 683,2            1 850,1            1 813,1            2 269,8            1 682,2            
Total assets 3 639,9            3 890,4            3 869,5            4 433,1            3 669,4            
Current liabilities
Borrowing (22,5)                (35,3)                (33,5)                (96,7)                (36,9)                
Derivative financial instruments (13,2)                (22,6)                (11,6)                (10,6)                (1,7)                  
Trade and other payables (1 588,5)           (1 727,1)           (1 714,3)           (2 090,1)           (1 999,8)           
Provisions (32,7)                (8,6)                  (5,0)                  (7,8)                  (221,2)              
Income tax payable (4,7)                  (8,3)                  (7,2)                  (12,2)                (4,8)                  
Total current liabilities (1 661,6)           (1 801,9)           (1 771,6)           (2 217,4)           (2 264,4)           
Non-current liabilities
Borrowing (606,4)              (614,0)              (598,5)              (592,0)              (924,3)              
Other payables -                   (48,7)                (64,0)                (67,3)                (75,4)                
Retirement benefit liabilities (373,9)              (515,8)              (406,2)              (810,6)              (721,5)              
Deferred tax liabilities (10,2)                (11,3)                (10,5)                (15,4)                (18,7)                
Provisions (4,2)                  (4,2)                  (2,1)                  (0,5)                  (70,3)                
Total non-current liabilities (994,7)              (1 194,0)           (1 081,3)           (1 485,8)           (1 810,2)           
Total liabilities (2 656,3)           (2 995,9)           (2 852,9)           (3 703,2)           (4 074,6)           
Net Assets 983,6               894,5               1 016,6            729,9               (405,2)              
Equity
Share capital 215,1               215,1               215,1               215,1               215,1               
Share premium 21,2                 21,2                 21,2                 21,2                 21,2                 
Translation reserve (36,4)                (33,3)                (38,9)                (0,9)                  (27,1)                
Hedging reserve (5,6)                  (11,2)                (8,2)                  (16,5)                (17,2)                
Fair value reserve 0,2                   0,3                   0,3                   0,5                   0,2                   
Merger reserve 414,6               400,9               393,7               389,0               391,4               
Retained earnings 358,1               279,7               410,3               92,7                 (1 019,1)           
(Deficit)/ Equity attributable to shareholders of the parent 967,2               872,7               993,5               701,1               (435,5)              
Non-controlling interests 16,4                 21,8                 23,1                 28,8                 30,3                 
Total (Deficit)/ Equity 983,6               894,5               1 016,6            729,9               (405,2)              
























Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013-2017 (Interim)lxxii-lxxvi   




Exhibit 5C: Carillion plc Historical Consolidated Cash Flow Statement, 2013- 2017 (Interim), 
in £ Millions 
 
 
Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013-2017 (Interim)lxxii-lxxvi  
2013 2014 2015 2016 30/06/2017
Cash flows from Operating activities
Group operating profit 124,4     175,0     183,4     145,6     (962,9)      
Depreciation and amortization 44,3       44,8       45,4       45,0       26,0         
Profit on disposal of property, plant and equipment and intangible assets 2,3         0,3         (14,4)      (6,4)       0,2          
Profit on disposal of Public Private Partnerships equity investments (44,6)      (13,9)      (37,7)      (12,7)      (0,4)         
Other non-cash movements (6,1)       (1,7)       (0,3)       1,9         1,9          
Non-recurring operating items 44,2       -        5 40,2       1025,6
Operating profit before changes in working capital 164,5    204,5    181,4    213,6    90,4        
Increase in inventories (1,1)       (1,4)       (14,3)      (6,3)       8,3          
(Increase)/ Decrease in trade and other receivables (123,8)    (40,1)      48,0       (290,6)    (513,7)      
Increase/ (Decrease) in trade and oher payables -40,6 50,5 (41,1)      301,5 182,0       
Cash from operations before cash flows on forward foreign currency
contracts, pension deficit recovery payments and non-recurring operating items (1,0)       213,5    174,0    218,2    (233,0)    
Cash flows on forward foreign currency contracts -        -        -        (34,6)      (6,3)         
Deficit recovery payments to pension schemes (39,2)      (46,0)      (47,4)      (46,6)      (21,0)       
Rationalisation costs (22,0)      (11,5)      -        -        -          
Non-recurring operating items -        -        (6,3)       (21,5)      (9,8)         
Cash generated from operations (62,2)     156,0    120,3    115,5    (270,1)    
Financial income received 11,1       2,9         2,4         2,5 1,9
Financial expense paid (30,9)      (29,6)      (35,3)      (39,6)      (20,2)       
Acquisition-related costs (1,0)       (1,2)       (6,6)       (0,9)       (1,1)         
Taxation payments 4,6         (4,3)       (7,5)       (4,2)       (0,5)         
Net cash flows from Operating activities (78,4)     123,8    73,3      73,3      (290,0)    
Cash flows from Investing activities
Disposal of property, plant and equipment and intangible assets 0,9         6,4         17,6       13,8       0,4          
Disposal of joint ventures and other investments 143,7     36,0       54,1       47,1       1,4          
Dividends received from joint ventures 18,2       9,1         16,8       11,8       4,6          
Loan advance repayments received from joint ventures 2,9         15,9       7,2         2,1         0,7          
Disposal and closure of business (0,3)       -        -        -        -          
Decrease in current asset investments 0,1         0,5         -        -        -          
Disposal of subisidiaries, net of cash and cash equivalents disposed -        -        -        -        24,5         
Acquisition of subsidiaries, net of cash and cash equivalents acquired (20,3)      (26,3)      (10,6)      (32,5)      (11,1)       
Acquisition of non-controlling interests -        (3,1)       -        -        
Acquisition of property, plant and equipment and intangible assets (28,1)      (28,8)      (30,4)      (37,3)      (19,4)       
Acquisition of equity in and loan advances to joint ventures (6,1)       (7,7)       (28,3)      (4,8)       (16,0)       
Acquisition of other non-current asset investments (3,8)       (1,2)       (0,4)       -        -          
Net cash flows from Investing activities 107,2    0,8        26,0      0,2        (14,9)      
Cash flows from Financing activities
Draw down/ (Repayment) of bank and other loans (171,0)    14,7       (19,0)      6,7         289,7       
Repayment of finance lease liabilities (16,7)      (9,2)       (6,0)       (7,4)       (4,9)         
Acquisition of own shares (2,2)       (0,5)       (0,4)       (1,0)       (1,1)         
Payment to employees in settlement of share options (0,3)       -        -        -        0
Dividends paid to equity holders of the parent (74,6)      -75,7 (76,8)      (78,9)      (54,4)       
Dividends paid to non-controlling interests (1,1)       (1,0)       (3,2)       (3,8)       (0,6)         
Net cash flows from Financing activities (265,9)   (71,7)     (105,4)   (84,4)     228,7      
Decrease in net cash and cash equivalents (237,1)   52,9      (6,1)       (10,9)     (76,2)      
Net cash and cash equivalents at 1 January 652,2     410,4     465,8     455,8 467,7
Effect of exchange rate fluctuations on net cash and cash equivalents (4,7)       2,5         (3,9)       22,8 (2,8)         
Net cash and cash equivalents at 31 December 410,4    465,8    455,8    467,7    388,7      


























Sources: Carillion PLC (CLLN: LSE) in Financial Times Equities’ Markets Data; Government 
Report on Carillion, May 2018i  
March 1, 2017: 
2016 Annual Report and 
Accounts is signed and 
published. 
 
Richard Adam (ex-Finance 
Director) sells his entire 
existing shares for £534,000. 
May, 2017: 
KPMG performs a “deep dive” 
review of Carillion’s key 
management contracts.  
June 9, 2017: 
Final Dividend for 2016 
is paid, totaling £55 
million. 
July 10, 2017: 
Carillion issues its first profit warning and 
announces contract provision of £845 
million. 
 
Richard Howson steps down as CEO and is 
replaced by Keith Cochrane as Interim CEO.  
July 12, 2017: 
Share Price falls 70% since the 
first Profit Warning. September 11, 2017: 
Zafar Khan is dismissed 
as Finance Director. 
September 29, 2017: 
Carillion issues its second 
profit warning, announcing 
an additional £200m write-
off. 
November 17, 2017: 
Carillion issues its third and final profit 
warning. The company heads towards 
breaching its financial  covenants. 
January 15, 2018: 
After a weekend of failed negotiations with 
banks and the Government, Carillion is 
declared insolvent and trading of its stock is 
immediately ceased.  









Tenure, as of March 
2017 





Chairman of the 
Board, 
Independent 
5 years and 9 
months 
✓Chief Executive of 





✓Chief Executive of 





✓Director and COO of 
Reuters Group, PLC 
✓Chairman, Sentebale 
✓COO DHL, Europe 
and Africa  
✓Founder of the 
charity Hope Through 
Action 
✓Advisor to the Prime-







7 years and 3 
months 
✓COO, Carillion PLC 




responsible for UK 
Construction and 
Middle East and North 
Africa, Carillion PLC 
✓Chairman of the CBI's 
Constructive Council 
✓Managing Director, 
Middle East and North 
Africa, Carillion PLC 
✓Non-Executive 













Middle East and North 
Africa, Carillion PLC 
✓Chief Financial 
Officer, Associated 
British Ports Holdings 
Ltd. 
✓Senior Financial Roles 
with BBA Group and 










1 year and 8 months 
✓Chief Executive of 
The Weir Group PLC 
✓UK Government Lead 
Non-Executive Director 
for the Scotland Office ✓Chief Executive, 
Stagecoach Group PLC 





Stagecoach Group PLC 
and Office of the 
Advocate General 




















Director, Hanson PLC 
(Diversified Industrial 
Co.) 
✓Member of the 





Director and Audit 
Committee Chair, 
Creston PLC   
✓Non-Executive 
Director and Audit 
Committee Member, 
Premier Farnell PLC   
✓Non-Executive 
Director and Chairman 
of Audit Committees, 
Taylor Wimpey PLC 
and Taylor Woodrow 
PLC   
✓Non-Executive 
Director and Audit 
Committee Member, 











✓Chief People Officer 













2 years and 11 
months 
✓Vice President 
Strategy, Royal Dutch 
Shell 
✓Executive Vice 





Middle East, Caspian 
and South Asia, Royal 
Dutch Shell 
✓Vice President of the 
Energy Institute UK 
 
Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2016lxxvi,pp.50-51  




Exhibit 7B: Carillion’s Board Responsibilities 
 
Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2016lxxvi, pp.53 
 







Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2016lxxvi, pp.54 








Source: Carillion plc Annual Reports and Accounts 2016lxxvi, pp. 52 
 
  

































Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2016lxxvi, pp.55




Exhibit 8C: Carillion plc’s Risk Management Framework 
 
Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2016lxxvi, pp. 30 
  























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Carillion's Dividend Payment, Profit and Cash from Operations 
(2005-2016)
Dividend Paid Profit for the year Cash generated from Operations








Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2016lxxvi 
 
Exhibit 10B: Carillion’s Executive Directors and Chairman’s Remuneration Evolution and 











Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2016lxxvi; Bloomberg Terminals 
 
Values in '000£
Salary/Fees Benefits Bonus LT Incentives Pension Total Remuneration
Executive Directors
Richard Howson (CEO) 610£                20£                  293£                146£                214£                1 283£                      
Richard Adam (Finance Director) 457£                20£                  215£                117£                162£                971£                         
Non-Executive Directors
Philip Green (Chairman) 193 -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     193£                         
Andrew Dougal 60 -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     60£                           
Alison Horner 60 -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     60£                           
Ceri Powell 60 -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     60£                           
Keith Cochrane 28 -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     28£                           
2015
Values in '000£
Salary/Fees Benefits Bonus LT Incentives Pension Total Remuneration
Executive Directors
Richard Howson (CEO) 660£                28£                  245£                346£                231£                1 510£                      
Richard Adam (Finance Director) 460£                19£                  140£                278£                163£                1 060£                      
Non-Executive Directors
Philip Green (Chairman) 215£                -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     215£                         
Andrew Dougal 61£                  -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     61£                           
Alison Horner 61£                  -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     61£                           
Ceri Powell 61£                  -£                     -£                     -£                     -£                     61£                           

















Carillion's Executive Directors and Chairman Remuneration (in 
£'000) and Carillion PLC Share Price Evolution, 2015 and 2016














Exhibit 11: Evolution of Carillion PLC’s “Other creditors” account, 2013-20166 
 
Source: Carillion plc Annual Report and Accounts 2013-2016lxxii-lxxv   
 
6 Carillion introduced its Early Payment Facility (EPF) in the beginning of 2013. Drawing on the EPF was included 





2013 2014 2015 2016
Evolution of Carillion PLC's "Other creditors" 
account (in £m), 2013-2016
Other creditors




Exhibit 12: Breakdown of the Fees paid by Carillion plc to KPMG (External Auditor), for both 
Auditing and Non-Auditing services, 2013-2016. 
 





2013 2014 2015 2016
KPMG Auditing and Non-Auditing Fees, 2013-2016 (in £m)
Audit fees Non-audit fees









Exhibit 13A: Carillion’s Top Shareholders as of December 2016 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminals 
 
Exhibit 13B: Carillion’s Shareholder Evolution, Q4 2016 – Q4 2017 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg Terminals 
  
Company % Share Issued Capital as of December 2016
BlackRock Inc. 8,68%
Schroders PLC 7,80%
Franklin Resources Inc. 6,49%
Brewin Dolphin Holdings 5,82%
Kiltearn Partners LLP 5,01%
Letko Brosseau and Associates 4,97%
Franklin Resources Inc. 6,49% 8,33% 1,77% 1,13% 1,13%
BlackRock Inc. 8,68% 7,38% 6,78% 1,21% 2,14%
Brewin Dolphin Holdings 5,82% 5,49% 4,99% 1,28% 1,09%
Kiltearn Partners LLP 5,01% 5,01% 5,01% 10,00% 4,94%
Letko Brosseau and Associates 4,97% 4,97% 6,11% 6,11% 2,77%
Dimensional Fund Advisors 4,05% 4,36% 4,36% 2,36% 4,51%
Harsgreaves Lansdown Asset Management Ltd. 3,27% 3,82% 4,87% 9,59% 13,02%
Interactive Investor Trading Ltd. 3,05% 3,46% 4,26% 6,91% 8,27%
Deutsche Bank AG 3,07% 3,32% 1,71% 3,85% 3,38%
Rathbone Brothers PLC 3,05% 3,06% 1,89% 0,45% 0,27%
Schroders PLC 7,80% 2,83% 3,22% 0,41% 0,00%
Legal & General Group PLC 2,59% 2,72% 2,63% 2,26% 2,40%
The Vanguard Group Inc. 2,43% 2,56% 2,82% 2,98% 2,63%
Barclays PLC 2,23% 2,43% 2,87% 5,17% 6,43%
Norges Bank 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 2,23% 0,00%
Standard Life Aberdeen PLC 2,67% 1,65% 5,85% 5,50% 5,73%
Halifax Share Dealing Ltd. 1,24% 1,53% 2,05% 3,85% 5,51%
HSBC Holdings PLC 1,24% 1,46% 1,75% 2,16% 2,44%
State Street Corp 0,95% 1,41% 2,01% 2,23% 2,07%
Marlborough Fund Managers Ltd. 2,36% 1,34% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Holdings 
Company
2016 Q4, % 
Issued Share 
Q1 2017, % 
Issued Share 
Q2 2017, % 
Issued Share 
Q3 2017, % 
Issued Share 
Q4 2017, % 
Issued Share 
